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In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three 
classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of 
these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these 
explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the 
unanimity criterion. 
 
Keywords: social choice, impossibility theorems, metric approach to compromise 
with the unanimity criterion 
 














                                                  
1 Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900 Israel, 
  11. Introduction 
Saari (2008) well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in 
social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective 
of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric 
approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion. 
.  
The three negative results discussed in Chapter 2 of his recent book and in Saari  
(1998), (2001), Saari and Petron (2006) and Li and Saari (2008) are Arrow's 
impossibility theorem (1951), Sen's Paretian-Liberal Paradox (1970) and 
Chichilinsky's topological  dictatorship result (1982a). Saari shows that the common 
thread that relates these results is that they are based on conditions that force the 
associated aggregation rule to ignore crucial information about individual preferences. 
In Arrow's case, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) condition forces 
the aggregation rule to concentrate solely on binary rankings, disregarding the 
consistency (transitivity) of individual preferences. In Sen's case, the Minimal 
Liberalism (ML) condition, again, prohibits the rule from using information about 
transitivity of individual preferences. In Chichilinsky's case, the Continuity (C) 
property emphasizes local behavior, ignoring the global structure of preferences.   
 
The change of these results to positive ones requires modification of the (implausible) 
conditions that prohibit the aggregation rule from using valuable information, such 
that it does use the vital missing information.  
 
Saari demonstrates the application of this approach in all three cases. He replaces IIA 
with condition IIIA, which ensures that the social preference relation is based on how 
individuals rank the alternatives as well as on the intensity of the ranking. This 
enables escape from Arrow's theorem and leads to the the Borda rule. The question 
'how to evade Sen's result is not completely resolved', but Saari proposes ways and 
some guidelines to sidestep the difficulty. One suggestion is to allow an agent to be 
decisive only if his decision does not impose strong negative externalities on others. 
Finally, to escape from Chichilinsky's negative result, Saari proposes to secure global 
instead of local information on individual preferences. In his example, such 
information involves both the individuals' preferred points in the different regions of 
alternatives and the ranking of the regions. 
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It seems to me that the metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity 
criterion is based on  recognition of Saari's plausible suggestion as to how to  obtain 
positive results in the above three cases. In other words, the metric approach can be 
rationalized applying Saari's insightful diagnosis of the reason for the trouble in the 
above three well known impossibility results. Let me briefly present the metric 
approach (Farkas and Nitzan (1979), Lehrer and Nitzan (1985), Cambell and Nitzan 
(1986)) and then illustrate its effectiveness in obtaining positive conclusions.  
 
2. The metric approach 
The metric approach to compromise with the unanimity criterion, henceforth the 
metric approach, utilizes information on individual preferences taking into account 
the intensity of rankings. The unanimity criterion is defined as follows. Suppose that 
the individual preference relations are strict orderings on the set of alternatives X. 
Denote by   the set of profiles where alternative x is most preferred in the set 
S, which is a subset of X, from the point of view of every individual. A social choice 
function C(P,S) satisfies the unanimity criterion if 
) , ( S x U
C(P,S)= (, ) UxS  {x}  ∈⇒  P  
Since in most profiles unanimity regarding the most preferred alternative does not 
exist, the unanimity criterion does not lead to a unique social choice function. The 
multiplicity of social choice functions that satisfy the unanimity criterion raises the 
question whether there exists one that compromises with the criterion in the sense that 
it is "closer" (in terms of a metric δ between profiles) than all the other functions to 
implementing the criterion. A social choice rule C(P,S) compromises with the 
unanimity criterion according to the metric δ if, for every subset S and for every 
preference profile P defined on X,        
 
 C (P,S) =   d (P|S ,U(y,S)) } ≤  d (P|S,U(x,S))  { , : S y S x ∈ ∀ ∈
 
where d (P,Q)=
V Q∈ min δ (P,Q)  is the distance between a profile P and a set of profiles 
V and  P|S is the restriction of the profile P to the set S. Notice that the metric δ 
enables measurement of preference intensity (as well as intra-personal and inter-
personal comparisons of preference intensities). The use of δ and of the profile sets 
  3U(.,.) in the above definition of the compromising rule C (P,S) ensures that the global 
structure of individual preferences and their intensity are taken into account in 
determining the social choice. 
 
3. Applications of the metric approach 
3.1 The possibility of positional rules 
A rule has a reasonable quasi-metric rationalization if it has a symmetric additively 
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neutral and monotonic. Lehrer and Nitzan (1985) have proved that a rule has a 
reasonable quasi-metric rationalization, if and only if it is a positional rule. By 
replacing the IIA condition of Arrow's theorem with 'the reasonable metric approach', 
the admissible rules are the positional rules. In the special case where  ' δ  is the 
inversion metric, Farkas and Nitzan (1979) have shown that the rule compromising 
with the unanimity criterion is the Borda positional rule. This positive result is closely 
related to Theorem 2.5 in Saari (2008).  
 
3.2 The libertarian resolution of the Paretian-liberal paradox 
Applying the metric approach to extend the individual preferences on alternatives to 
preferences on an individual's assigned rights (these second-order rankings are based 
on the intensity of the ordinal preferences), Harel and Nitzan (1987) demonstrate that 
the Paretian-liberal paradox can be resolved by allowing voluntary exchange of rights. 
As shown by Saari and Petron (2004), for any decision rule that satisfies Sen's (ML) 
condition, in each cycle, each and every agent suffers a strong negative externality 
that is caused by the choices made by some decisive agent. The libertarian approach 
of Harel and Nitzan is based, first, on the use of preference intensity to define 
preferences on rights and then on Coase's observation, the Coase theorem, that the 
externalities problem can be resolved by voluntary exchange; in our case, the 
exchange of rights. 
 
3.3 Consistency between unanimity, anonymity and modified continuity 
 In a topological setting, the metric approach, which applies information of preference 
intensity, can again be used to establish a possibility result. Using a finite framework, 
Baigent (1986), following Chichilinsky's (1982b) topological approach, has 
  4considered a proximity preservation property for a social choice rule. This property 
requires that the "smaller" the change in individual preferences, the "smaller" the 
change in the social choice. It has been shown that this property is inconsistent with 
the plausible unanimity property and the anonymity property (a weaker form of 
dictatorship). The problem of this 'continuity' property is that it does not allow the rule 
to recognize the structure of the decision problem. A resolution of this problem by 
taking into account the missing information can be based on the use of an alternative 
property of proximity preservation, namely the metric respect for the unanimity 
criterion. A social choice rule has this property, if the "closer" a profile is to an ideal 
situation where some alternative is a unanimously preferred outcome, the "closer" the 
social choice to this alternative. This modified 'continuity' property succeeds in 
eliminating inconsistency with the unanimity and anonymity properties because it 
does not ignore the explicit global structure of preferences. This is illustrated in 
Nitzan (1989).  
 
4. Conclusion 
In his recent book, Saari (2008) accomplishes his objective of disposing dictators and 
demystifying voting paradoxes. I have tried to prove that he also demystifies the 
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